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avoid by making deliberate breaks with tradition. A chief aim of the mod-
erns during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was to restore order 
to a culture which they thought had been fragmented by their predeces-
sors. The one error many of these moderns refused to tolerate was eclecti-
cism, or the lack of a rigorous foundation for one's own beliefs. 
Dupre's suggestions for a critique of modernity in this book seriously 
underestimate the extent to which the very moderns whom he criticizes 
were dedicated to achieving a goal similar to his own: the creation of a new 
Christian synthesis of nature and the human subject with a transcendent 
God. Why does he think that his twentieth-century project stands a better 
chance of succeeding where the attempts of modern philosophers from 
Descartes to Kant failed? More importantly, why does he think that what 
the late humanists and late scholastics, such as Gassendi and Suarez, could not 
accomplish can possibly be achieved by anyone else? My own view is that 
the late humanists and late scholastics were better placed than both the 
moderns and the critics of modernity to fulfill Dupre's aims, and their fail-
ure to do so is one of the great lessons of history. There were indeed good 
reasons to become a modern in the context of that failure. Whatever else 
their shortcomings, the modern philosophers had no illusions about this 
and recognized that the methods of the late humanists needed radical revi-
sion. Dupre, who seeks to resuscitate the outlook of Christian humanism 
with the help of Heideggerian metaphysics, would do well to consider that 
much of what he regards as modernity's errors began as the rational choices 
of those who knew firsthand the excesses of too many beliefs about tran-
scendent realities. Passage to Modernity is certainly right in its claim that 
modern values and attitudes were well established long before the 
Enlightenment, but this highly engaging book obscures a central feature of 
its two-stage narrative: the modernity of the Enlightenment was in many 
ways an unavoidable outcome of the modernity of the Renaissance. Any 
project which tries to revive the latter while subverting the former cannot 
base its claim to plausibility on an argument from history. 
NOTES 
1. Brian P. Copenhaver and Charles B. Schmitt, Renaissance Philosophy 
(Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 349-50. 
Belief Policies, by Paul Helm. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1994. Pp. xiii and 226. $54.95 (Cloth). 
TRENTON MERRICKS, Virginia Commonwealth University 
A belief-policy, according to Paul Helm, is a type of belief. A belief-
policy is, to a first approximation, a belief about how what one believes 
ought to be related to one's evidence, given that one's goal is forming 
true beliefs. There is no question that many of us have higher-order 
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beliefs about how we ought to form our beliefs in the face of evidence. 
And of course one can, as Helm does, understand much of what occurs 
and has occurred in epistemology as the development and defense of 
one such higher-order belief or another. Helm's project is to elucidate 
the notion of a belief-policy and to show that a proper understanding of 
belief-policies casts light on other topics of interest to the epistemologist. 
A central tenet of the book is that belief-policies provide the key to 
understanding the role of the will in belief formation (Chapters 1 and 2). 
Helm notes that we praise and blame people for the beliefs they have 
and the way they form those beliefs; he then argues that this sort of nor-
mativity makes sense only if we assume that a person's will is intimately 
involved in what she believes. (Helm's account of the will and volun-
tary action and belief is explicitly compatibilistic (see esp. ] 76ff.).) But 
what exactly is the role of the will? Helm rejects a straightforward dox-
astic voluntarism, denying that one can simply form beliefs at will-I 
cannot simply believe that, for example, I am King of North America, 
and neither can you. Instead, says Helm, the will is involved in the for-
mation of belief-policies, which formation is, to some extent, voluntary. 
Two questions ought immediately to leap to mind. If most belief for-
mation is not voluntary, why is the formation of belief-polIcies-which 
are themselves a kind of belief-voluntary? And how does the will's 
involvement in forming a belief-policy, only one of the many beliefs a 
person has, translate into the will being involved in all (or most) of our 
other beliefs, thus allowing for the normativity associated with most of 
our believings? 
Helm's answers to these questions flow from a single elegant picture. 
Doxastic voluntarism is false because, according to Helm, most of one's 
beliefs are the involuntary result of a combination of the evidence pre-
sented to one and one's belief-policy. Given that one has a certain belief-
policy, there is no room for the will to act in forming beliefs based on 
evidence (except perhaps in unusual circumstances, such as when the 
evidence is balanced between a belief and its denial). And this diagnosis 
of why doxastic voluntarism fails leaves open the possibility that one's 
belief-policy is not involuntary, since one cannot argue that one's belief-
policy itself is an involuntary result of one's belief-policy (combined 
with evidence). Moreover, once we grant that the will is involved in 
belief-policy acceptance, and that most other beliefs are determined, in 
part, by one's belief-policy, it follows that in most of one's beliefs the 
will plays an important role, albeit at one remove. (And Helm main-
tains that other accounts of the will's involvement in belief formation, 
such as Pascalian attempts to undertake actions that eventually result in 
belief, are unsatisfying since they apply to only limited cases, and thus 
fail to provide a role for the will in the majority of our believings.) 
To better understand Helm's overall picture, suppose, for example, 
that I have a belief-policy that includes: if p is a proposition about (say) 
physics, believe p if and only if the evidence makes p more likely than 
not. You, however, may have a competing belief-policy which instructs 
you, if p is a proposition about physics, to believe p if and only if there is 
a high level of evidence indicating that p is almost certainly true. 
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Confronted with the same data, I might believe that p, whereas you 
might withhold belief altogether. The evidence alone does not dictate 
whether to believe or withhold p. And Helm argues that evidence alone 
is never sufficient to dictate which belief-policy to endorse. Other fac-
tors, such as a decision about whether to maximize truth or minimize 
falsehood, are relevant. So we can explain why I believe p but you do 
not-even though we are confronted with the same evidence-by refer-
ence to differing voluntary choices we have made, choices in belief-poli-
cy selection and construction. 
In order for a certain belief to be a person's belief-policy, must that 
person explicitly embrace that belief? Presumably not, for Helm's use of 
belief-policies presupposes that every person who may be praised or 
blamed for belief has a belief-policy, and surely many-probably most-
people lack an explicit account of how their beliefs ought to relate to the 
evidence. And it is at least odd to think that my belief that there is a tree 
in front of me is a result (causal?) not just of my sense perception and 
way of conceptualizing the world, but also of a higher-order belief I 
have about how my beliefs ought to conform to the evidence. So per-
haps, instead, a belief-policy is a belief we attribute to someone on the 
basis of how they form beliefs in the light of differing kinds and quanti-
ties of evidence. But if this is case, then it is vacuous to claim that the 
same evidence results in different beliefs in different people because 
these people have different belief-policies. Moreover, if belief-policies 
are abstractions, descriptions of the way one involuntarily forms partic-
ular beliefs given certain kinds of evidence, it is unclear how belief-poli-
cies themselves could be voluntary. Helm does not address these wor-
ries, nor is there enough detail along these lines in Belief Policies to know 
how he would address them. 
Above I considered two "partial" policies, policies restricted to 
propositions about physics. A "complete" policy would include, of 
course, instructions concerning under what conditions beliefs of every 
sort ought to be accepted or rejected. One completely general belief-pol-
icy Helm discusses is "sufficient evidentialism" -the doctrine that one 
ought to form all of one's beliefs only on the basis of sufficient evidence. 
Sufficient evidentialism is widely recognized to suffer from serious, per-
haps fatal, self-referential problems. But if Helm is correct, we can go 
beyond seeing that sufficient evidentialism is false, and explain what is 
wrong with it. For if Helm is correct, no belief is the result of only evi-
dence; rather belief is the result of evidence evaluated in the light of a 
voluntarily chosen belief-policy, a policy that itself cannot be the result 
of evidence alone. This is one example of how Helm's overall project 
suggests new insights into issues already of interest to epistemologists. 
Another epistemological issue that Helm connects with belief-policies 
in an interesting way is that of responsibility for belief (pp. 168ft.). It is 
reasonable to suppose that someone who is hypnotized to believe that p 
is not, in some important sense, responsible for her belief that p, where-
as one who believes that p as a result of normal causes is. How do we 
explain the difference in responsibility, if we deny, along with Helm, 
doxastic voluntarism? Helm says that the belief-policy of the subject of 
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hypnosis plays no role in forming (or sustaining) her belief that p; we 
might therefore say that the belief that p is not truly "her own", and she 
cannot be held responsible for it. Thus Helm, while denying that we 
have voluntary control over most of our beliefs, can distinguish between 
beliefs that are truly our own and those that are foisted upon us. And of 
course those beliefs that result, in part, from one's own belief-policy owe 
part of their genesis to the act of one's will in choosing a belief-policy. I 
think Helm's understanding of belief ownership should be found inter-
esting and plausible by anyone who, like Helm, wants to maintain a dis-
tinction between involuntary beliefs for which one is responsible and 
involuntary beliefs for which one is not responsible. 
Helm's final chapter, on fideism, should be of particular interest to 
readers of Faith and Philosophy. Helm understands fideism as a family of 
belief-policies, sharing in common the claim that knowledge of, or belief 
in, certain religious doctrines is not grounded in evidence, reason, or 
argument. But Helm notes that, while this is not true of all the belief-
policies in the fideistic cluster, some fideistic belief-policies can be 
defended by argument, and that such policies are, therefore, not obvi-
ously an affront to reason. So one could have reasons and arguments for 
embracing the second-order belief that one's religious beliefs ought not 
to be grounded in reason or argument. Helm's distinction between the 
belief-policy of fideism and fideistically formed religious beliefs shows 
clearly that the claim that the religious beliefs of the fideist are not the 
result of reason does not imply that fideism itself must be unreasonable. 
Helm also thinks that belief-policies provide the resources for one use-
ful understanding of rationality. According to Helm, rationality is to a 
large extent person-relative; a belief is rational if and only if it accords 
with one's belief-policy and one's belief-policy does not violate certain 
"necessary conditions for rationality as such" (p. 113). Of course, any 
belief-policy will accord with itself, so it seems that any belief policy 
which meets Helm's "necessary conditions" will itself be rational. And 
perhaps there is an important sense of 'rational' according to which we 
should acknowledge that a wide range of belief-policies count as rational. 
Helm thinks there are two necessary conditions for rationality that 
any belief-policy ought to satisfy: 
Such conditions will include logical consistency; that is, as far as 
the holder of any belief-policy knows or is aware, the beliefs 
warranted by it must be consistent. Further, a belief-policy 
should be subjectively closed under deducibility and conjunc-
tion. That is, as far as the believer is concerned, if a belief-policy 
commits such a person to believing p, and p entails q, then the 
believer is committed to believing q. And likewise with con-
junction. (p. 114) 
But there are serious problems with Helm's supposed necessary con-
ditions. Consider the (so-called) Paradox of the Preface. An author 
makes many claims in a book, claims that she believes; yet in a preface 
she acknowledges that surely one or another of the claims she makes is 
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mistaken. Such an author, therefore, does not believe the conjunction of 
each of her beliefs; moreover she holds-and could well be aware that 
she holds-beliefs that are not all possibly true (it is not possible that her 
assertion in the preface and all the other assertions contained in the book 
be true). So by Helm's account, the author's belief-policy and all of her 
beliefs formed in accord with that policy are irrational. But this is obvi-
ously a reductio of Helm's purported necessary conditions, and we ought 
therefore to reject them. Helm does not address the Paradox of the 
Preface. (It is only Helm's claims about consistency and closure under 
conjunction that are threatened by the Paradox of the Preface; that a 
rational belief-policy ought to be closed under deducibility is also con-
troversial-consider the literature on truth-tracking and skeptical 
hypotheses-but much more plausible.) 
Helm endorses another criterion for choosing a good belief-policy. 
He thinks one ought to select a policy that is conservative, that is, that (at 
least at the outset) sanctions most of one's beliefs (123 ff.). So he advises 
a "particularist" as opposed to a "methodist" approach to epistemology. 
But conservatism and particularism are themselves belief-policies, 
beliefs about which belief-policies (which are themselves beliefs) one 
ought to hold given the evidence of what one already believes. If Helm 
were just to assert that conservative belief-policies are preferred, he 
would be doing no more than recommending a policy without giving 
reasons for it. 
Helm does seem to offer one reason to endorse conservatism. He 
says that conservative policies are less arbitrary than others. The argu-
ment seems to be, roughly, that if we are to pick a belief-policy that sanc-
tions some set of beliefs, the least arbitrary choice is the one that sanc-
tions those beliefs we already have. But the problem with this should be 
apparent-the belief that one's belief-policy ought to be chosen in a 
manner that is not arbitrary is itself a belief-policy. It is a belief-policy 
about how one ought to form beliefs given the evidence of what is, and 
is not, arbitrary. 
While addressing issues of belief-policy selection and construction, 
Helm notes that there are other perfectly respectable areas of philosophy, 
such as ethics, in which decisive evidence does not determine the theory 
one embraces. There is, however, a crucial difference between belief-policy 
selection and ethical theory selection. One might be able to give a reason 
(not necessarily decisive) for an ethical theory that was not itself an ethical 
theory; but reasons for belief-policies-that is, claims about what policies 
are reasonable in the light of the evidence-must be belief-policies. 
None of this is to say that conservative belief-policies are not best. 
Maybe they are. Personally, I am convinced they are. But Helm offers no 
defense of conservatism or any policy or class of policies that does not 
itself presuppose a belief-policy. On the one hand this is disappointing, 
especially given Helm's explicit claim at the start of the book that what 
he says will be "overtly prescriptive" (p. 1). On the other hand, it is prob-
ably unavoidable, since it appears to be impossible to give a reason to 
endorse a belief-policy that is not itself a belief-policy (any such reason 
will be the expression of a belief about which belief-policies-themselves 
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beliefs-are best given whatever evidence is deemed relevant). 
Even if Helm's defense of certain belief-policies is not as satisfying as 
one might hope, we can still learn something from his way of conceptu-
alizing the issues. For example, Helm would have us ask "What can we 
say in support of the higher-order belief that beliefs formed by sense 
perception have some presumption in their favor?" in place of the more 
familiar "Can we give a non-question-begging defense of the reliability 
of sense perception?". It may be that Helm's way of asking these ques-
tions will open new possibilities for those who wish to answer them, or 
perhaps make clearer that certain answers must always be unavailable. 
Belief Policies offers a novel and, in my judgment, useful approach to 
its subject matter. This book provides a new perspective from which to 
view some issues in epistemology that already receive a good deal of 
attention. It also pushes to the surface interesting and important issues 
that do not receive enough attention, such as questions about the role of 
the will in belief formation and parallels between epistemology and 
ethics-parallels that can be eclipsed by other waX's of approaching epis-
temology. This is a fine book well worth reading. 
* Thanks to my colleagues Tony Ellis, Gene Mills, and Peter Vallentyne 
for helpful comments on an early draft of this review. 
The God Who Acts, edited by Thomas F. Tracy. University Park, PA: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994. Pp. x and 148. $28.50 (Cloth); 
$14.95 (Paper). 
CHARLES TALIAFERRO, St. Olaf College. 
This is a fine collection of four original papers by philosophers and 
theologians on the theistic concept of Divine agency. Each of the papers 
is followed by a critical response from different authors and the result is 
a book that is genuinely a case of philosophical theology (or, if you like, 
theological philosophy). 
In "Divine Action: Some Moral Considerations" Maurice Wiles articu-
lates an ostensibly deistic version of Christianity. He defends the intelli-
gibility of thinking of God as the creator and sustainer of the cosmos, a 
God who creates but does not author miracles or other specific providen-
tial events. He adopts a free-will defense to preserve the belief in God's 
goodness. According to Wiles, creation involves a severe divine self-limi-
tation and "the concept of divine intervention clearly constitutes a quali-
fication of the nature and extent of that divine self-limitation" (p. 22). 
Supernaturalist versions of theism in which God does intervene in 
human history face a serious ethical problem. If God intervenes to save 
some people and not others, this is unfair. With respect to the Matthaen 
story of the Massacre of the Innocents, Wiles asks: "If God warns 
through dreams, why only Joseph'? Were the other children of 
Bethlehem dispensable?"(p. 21) If specific divine acts that prevent disas-
